Mark Bristow has spent three decades navigating civil wars and coups to build some of Africa’s richest gold mines, but now Barrick Gold’s boss is being strong-armed by a Mali junta desperate for cash.

That hasn’t always been the case. When mutinying soldiers overthrew Mali’s government in 2012, the putsch leader closed the border to everyone except employees of Bristow’s Randgold Resources, which was issued with permits to fly bullion out of the West African country.

More than a decade later, a different military regime has issued a warrant for Bristow’s arrest, as a months-long dispute over how to divide the economic benefits from the nation’s biggest mine comes to a head.

It’s a prize worth fighting for: not only is Mali the continent’s second-largest gold producer, but Barrick’s Loulo-Gounkoto is a low-cost mine producing more than half a million ounces a year, putting it in a select group of so-called tier one assets.

In Mali and beyond, Bristow established a reputation for thriving in African jurisdictions considered overly risky by many rivals. He piloted small planes taking investors to the mines he built from scratch, and by training local workers and avoiding expatriates, Bristow made his operations resilient to political turmoil. And crucially, he delivered the royalties and taxes that governments expected.

But his famed trouble-shooting skills are being put to the test, with Mali threatening to let a key permit lapse at Loulo-Gounkoto in 2026. The regime hasn’t disclosed its exact demands, though Barrick has offered about $370 million to settle a tax claim arising from a disputed government audit.

Now the military junta wants to arrest Bristow and Loulo-Gounkoto’s general manager for money laundering. Four other Barrick employees were detained and charged last month.

Bristow’s previous attempts to win over African leaders have yielded mixed outcomes. Soon after taking charge of Barrick, the outspoken South African swiftly ended a long-running row with the Tanzanian authorities during which a subsidiary was hit with a $190-billion tax bill and exports were banned. However, as head of Randgold, his efforts to lobby the then Congolese president to reverse aspects of a new mining code proved ineffective.

Bristow developed Loulo-Gounkoto during a two-decade stint as chief executive officer of Randgold, which was acquired by Barrick almost six years ago. But since taking the helm of the world’s No. 2 gold miner, his task in Mali has been made harder by an increasingly complex geopolitical backdrop.

After ousting the elected president four years ago, the military regime led by General Assimi Goita has strengthened its relationship with Russia and shunned ties with traditional partners like the US and France. A gold industry enjoying near record bullion prices is a soft target for a cash-strapped government that’s struggling to keep the power on and needs funds to pay Russian mercenaries that it’s hired to combat an Islamist insurgency.

Mali has either concluded or is negotiating agreements for the four biggest miners in the country to pay more than $840 million to settle claims, mainly for alleged back taxes, following a sector-wide audit. That’s the equivalent to a sixth of the government’s total planned expenditure this year.

The government is also pushing companies with existing operations to move toward a mining code adopted last year, which gives the state larger stakes in their assets, while reducing the duration of licenses and hiking royalties.

RESOLUTE DETENTION

Resolute Mining CEO Terry Holohan was released from detention in the capital, Bamako, last month, after the Australian company announced it would pay $160 million to Mali and migrate its Syama asset to the updated mining law. B2Gold and Allied Gold revealed fresh agreements, which both involve settlement payments, in September for their Fekola and Sadiola mines, respectively, as well as their expansion projects.

The four companies, including Barrick, contributed 92% of the approximately $1.1-billion paid to the Malian state last year, according to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Barrick, Allied and B2Gold didn’t respond to emails and calls from Bloomberg. Nor did Mali’s mines and finance ministries. Resolute declined to comment, but previously said claims against the company were “unsubstantiated.”

The military government hasn’t outlined the allegations leveled at the imprisoned Barrick managers, who were also detained briefly in September. Barrick denies any wrongdoing and has said the audit’s findings are “legally and factually flawed.”

“It looks like a shakedown,” said Peter Leon, Africa-chair at London-headquartered law firm Herbert Smith Freehills. Mali’s approach “is also short-sighted as it is not going to promote investment in the country,” he said.

The battle over Mali’s biggest mine, which last year produced almost 700 000 oz of gold and contributed almost 14% of Barrick’s total output, comes as missed production targets and higher operational costs leave Bristow’s company struggling to capitalize on the gold boom. While bullion has soared 28% in 2024, the firm’s share price is close to where it started the year.

Eight years ago, the then Randgold CEO said the company’s Mali operations were “a shining example of how this continent’s mineral resources can be converted into world-class mines, benefiting all stakeholders, not least the host country and its people.”

After last month’s arrests, Bristow said he remains intent on doing a deal with the government, but conceded that “attempts to find a mutually acceptable resolution have so far been unsuccessful.”

Bristow said Barrick — which along with Randgold has invested more than $10-billion in Mali over 29 years — is committed to an outcome that preserves the “long-term viability” of Loulo-Gounkoto. The company has proposed raising the government’s share of economic benefits from the complex to 55% and has already paid the first $85 million installment of the settlement that’s being discussed.

Mali, which has been under military rule since 2020, hired mercenaries from the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group three years ago. Following the death last year of the group’s founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, Moscow has been recruiting for an African force that would replace Wagner while allowing the Kremlin to consolidate control of its business network on the continent, including potentially lucrative mining interests.

As Russia seeks to revive its Cold War-era clout in Africa, Western influence is diminishing. European forces and United Nations peacekeepers were forced to withdraw from Mali over the past two years.

Similar geopolitical shifts — with a more assertive Russia and a retreat by the old colonial power France — have also been witnessed in neighboring countries. Niger has stripped uranium permits from western firms and blocked exports, while Burkina Faso has changed its mining code.

However, the trend extends beyond troubled nations of the Sahel to countries such as Senegal and Ivory Coast, which are either auditing natural resource contracts or adjusting mining laws.

Although at least one small transaction to buy exploration assets in Mali has collapsed due to the government’s approach, some say the country is still a lucrative place to develop gold mines.

That includes Phil Russo, managing director of Toubani Resources, despite the company’s shares slumping more than 50% from a peak in September.

“You can build them relatively competitively versus other parts of the world and in good time,” said Russo, who is raising funds for a 160 000 ounce per year project in Mali. “We know this is possible under the new mining code but like any agreement, in any jurisdiction, there are some items to discuss.”